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Summary
This article investigates some of the implications of the linguistic turn in modern philo-
sophy for the development of social psychology. The linguistic turn, according to which
language does not primarily mirror reality or our experience but is co-constructive thereof,
gave rise to productive developments in social psychology. Wittgenstein’s insight that the
meaning of words depends on their use value in specific language games made it possible
to see social cognition as an interactive and social achievement, rather than as a self-
enclosed mental process merely directed at the social environment. Post-structuralist deve-
lopments like those of Derrida and Foucault, based on the structuralist linguistics of De
Saussure, make the psychological subject, experience, social institutions and knowledge
products of more fundamental textual processes. Despite contradictions these approaches
underlie the development of what may be called a discursive social psychology: a discipline
focusing on the different discursive aspects of social psychological life, which refuses to
restrict that life to individual levels of analysis.
Die taalwending en die sosiale sielkunde
Hierdie artikel ondersoek sommige van die implikasies van die taalwending in die moderne
filosofie vir die ontwikkeling van die sosiale sielkunde. Die taalwending, waarvolgens taal
nie primêr die werklikheid of ons ervaring weerspieël nie maar medebepalend is daarvan,
het aanleiding gegee tot produktiewe ontwikkelinge in die sosiale sielkunde. Wittgenstein
se insig dat die betekenis van woorde saamhang met hulle gebruikswaarde in bepaalde
taalspele het dit moontlik gemaak om sosiale kognisie te sien as ’n interaktiewe en sosiale
prestasie eerder as ’n self-geslote mentale proses wat slegs gerig is op die sosiale omgewing.
Poststrukturalistiese ontwikkelinge soos dié van Derrida en Foucault, geskoei op insigte
van die strukturalistiese linguistiek van De Saussure, maak die sielkundige subjek,
ervaring, sosiale institusies en kennis self die produkte van meer fundamentele tekstuele
prosesse. Ten spyte van kontradiksies onderlê hierdie benaderings die ontwikkeling van wat
genoem kan word ’n diskursiewe sosiale sielkunde: ’n dissipline gefokus op die verskillende
diskursiewe aspekte van die sosiaal-sielkundige lewe en daartoe verbind om die sosiaal-
sielkundige lewe nie tot individuele vlakke van analise te beperk nie.
Mr D Painter, Dept of Psychology, Rhodes University, P O Box 7426, East London
5200; E-mail: d.painter@ru.ac.za; Miss W H Theron, Dept of Psychology, University
of Stellenbosch, Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602; E-mail: wht@maties.sun.ac.za
Acta Academica 2001 33(3): 36-66
The past few decades have seen discussions about the nature oflanguage in the philosophy and methodology of the socialsciences become increasingly important. The insights yielded
challenge the social sciences on epistemological, ontological and me-
thodological levels, thus affecting the core regions of social scientific
self-understanding as well as disciplinary formations or identities. Of
primary concern here is the shift from a conception of language as a
purely referential or representational system to one in which lan-
guage is considered to mediate our thoughts and experiences of rea-
lity. When followed through, this understanding of language threat-
ens to implode the traditional scientific resorts of ontological essen-
tialism and epistemological foundationalism, and to erode the appeal
of the research methods that attempt to ensure them.
Such notions may seem threatening and destabilising. They have
nevertheless been adopted with great enthusiasm by critical social
scientists. The linguistic turn in philosophy as a whole (Van der
Merwe 1994: 92) can now be traced to various new forms of practice
in the social sciences. These reveal a pervasive concern with language
as primarily a non-referential, constructive system that displaces the
burden of meaning from either transcendental subjectivity or a pre-
existing reality to the structure or implementation of language itself.
Precisely how language implements and manages meaning —
whether it is a structural or a rhetorical accomplishment — is still,
and will in all likelihood remain, a site of debate. For the moment it
suffices to note that it is precisely the destabilising and apparently
threatening effect of such new conceptions of language that induces
excitement about their extension to the social sciences as models for
understanding social processes and the participation of individuals in
social life.
This paper describes the role of language in the critique and the
reconstruction of a specific area of social scientific work, namely so-
cial psychology. Important contributions have been made in this re-
gard, especially during the last fifteen years. There is a strong impe-
tus in South Africa too, primarily under the auspices of Discourse
Analysis. However, the development of Discourse Analysis entails
more than the addition of yet another (qualitative) research method
to social psychology. At stake is a much deeper conceptual reworking
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of the field, as well as the gradual demarcation of metatheoretical ac-
counts that challenge traditional models, especially those associated
with information-processing approaches to social cognition. To dis-
tinguish this metatheoretical shift from more practical issues of me-
thodology, we will refer in this paper to discursive social psychology
rather than to discourse analysis.
There are, however, different approaches to language operating in
the broad area of discursive social psychology. What is shared is the
idea that language is not primarily a referential system. Language is
addressed as discourse; as an active and constructive medium, not a
mere mirror of the world. The general implication of this for social
psychology is that talk and text do not give the researcher access to un-
derlying cognitive processes or psychological states. Rather, psycholo-
gical phenomena are seen to emerge from interactive and communal
processes within which language plays an indispensable role — even
though that role is understood and theorised differently across the va-
rious traditions.
In the light of the above the central argument of this paper is that
discursive social psychology challenges the received view of mean-
ingful social action as being determined by purely individual pro-
cesses of information processing. This challenge proceeds by way of
both epistemological and political critiques of cognitive individua-
lism in social psychology. It will be argued that despite the differen-
ces and contradictions among the various forms of discursive social
psychology they still provide a coherent foundation for the develop-
ment of a more socially responsive and responsible social psychology.
1. The language turn in twentieth-century thought
Twentieth-century philosophy displays a pervasive concern with lan-
guage. References to a “linguistic turn” are now commonplace in
philosophy, referring to the way in which the various intellectual tra-
ditions, in largely independent fashion, have come to the conclusion
that language is not the transparent vehicle of thought and experi-
ence which it was traditionally understood to be. Rather, language
has increasingly revealed itself as an obstacle that should be account-
ed for in terms of its mediating and even constitutive role in thought
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and experience (Van der Merwe 1994: 93). This gradual realisation
surpassed the internal transformation of philosophy and also caused a
“changing of the guard” in both the philosophy and the practice of
the social sciences. It would in fact be justified to say that the preoc-
cupation with language and its constructive nature is one of the most
important features of the contemporary state of academic debate in
the social sciences and the humanities.
The linguistic turn in philosophy depends on certain general as-
sumptions. First, language does not passively represent thought and
experience, but plays a constitutive role in our thought and our ex-
perience of reality. In some recent approaches, as will become clear,
language is in fact credited with the construction of reality. Secondly,
and in association with this, language is not simply a collection of
names. This implies that the meanings of words are not entirely ex-
ternal to language — they are based neither in an objectively known
reality, nor in the conceptual projections of a self-present and self-
reflexive mind. The meanings of words are to a large extent either a
product of relationships internal to the linguistic system, or a func-
tion of their contextual use. Thirdly, with language no longer seen as
primarily referential, and the self-evident nature of thought and ex-
perience discarded in favour of a constructionist logic, our epistemo-
logical relation to reality has become dependent upon interpretation
(Van der Merwe 1994: 92-4).
To relate these general comments to the discussion of social psy-
chology we will briefly introduce two specific traditions of philoso-
phical reflection on language. The first is the tradition of analytic
philosophy and its concern with ordinary language, spearheaded and
represented here by the influential work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
The second is that of post-structuralism, or more broadly, all  ap-
proaches proceeding from the linguistic work of Ferdinand de Saus-
sure. This model of language will be discussed here along with its
post-structuralist deconstruction by Jacques Derrida. While these
traditions and their representatives are adequate exemplars of the
process under discussion, namely the shift from referential to non-
referential understandings of language, they are also more than this.
Discursive social psychologists actively engage with these ideas in
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theoretical discussion, making them important and explicit reference
points for recent developments in this discipline.
1.1 Language as use: Wittgenstein and beyond
Wittgenstein’s early work was still guided by the assumption that
meaning has a universal, logical structure, and that its relation to
language is thus transcendental (Pears 1985: 46-68; Wittgenstein
1961). Hence it had to be possible to determine the limits of mean-
ingful language by means of a purely philosophical reflection on lo-
gic. This focus on the transcendental, logical preconditions of the
constitution of meaning reveals a very traditional understanding of
language as transparent: language merely carries a pre-existing struc-
ture. Wittgenstein’s early philosophy was in fact an attempt to arti-
culate a radically positivist conception of scientific discourse. As for-
mulated by Van der Merwe & Voestermans (1995: 30),
Wittgenstein attempts to justify these traditional assumptions by
reducing language, through a rigorous logical analysis, to the essen-
tial structure or “logical grammar” which makes the constitution of
meaning — and therefore the reference of language to experience —
possible.
For this, Wittgenstein reduced language to propositions consist-
ing of elements providing logical pictures of facts or possible facts in
the world. In other words, there was (or should be) an exact pictorial
correspondence between the elements of a meaningful sentence or
proposition and that which it depicts. It was this correspondence that
made any linguistic product meaningful. The consequence of this is
that many language acts we encounter in our everyday lives (as well
as in science) aren’t really meaningful, and thus fall outside the do-
main of scientific knowledge — since “the only experiences express-
ible or describable by means of language are actual or possible per-
ceptions of actual or possible empirical facts” (Van der Merwe &
Voestermans 1995: 31).
Wittgenstein later realised that this theory of language was clear-
ly self-defeating. Describing meaningful language as consisting of
propositions that picture objects or facts in the world is itself a lin-
guistic statement or language act — one that cannot itself make
claim to being meaningful. Since it is impossible to verify such a
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view of language with reference to any sort of (possible) fact in the
world, it must be dismissed as an unverifiable metaphysical specula-
tion, and always beyond the threshold of scientific knowledge. In
short, in terms of his own understanding of meaning, a theory of lan-
guage such as his own is impossible. The implications of this insight
were immense in the subsequent development of Wittgenstein’s
thought and Western philosophy at large. As Van der Merwe & Voes-
termans (1995: 32) state:
By default the book on a whole history of naïvety with regard to the
functions of language in our experience of the world was finally and
effectively closed by showing that the function of language cannot
and should not be reduced to that of representation.
Wittgenstein’s “mistake” indeed created a huge philosophical
shift, and he spent the rest of his life working out its implications for
philosophy as well as for other disciplines, such as mathematics and
psychology. In the critical commentary on his work this gave rise to
the common distinction between early and later Wittgenstein (Pears
1985: 11). Just as the early philosophy resonates with the logical po-
sitivism that fed into behaviourism in psychology, the later philoso-
phy is closely related to subsequent developments in psychology and
social psychology. It is used explicitly to give form to a discursive so-
cial psychology on at least two levels. First, Wittgenstein’s analytical
turn to the ordinary use of language, rather than studying a suppo-
sedly transcendental and logical grammar, coupled with the conse-
quent notion of language games, paved the way for a more socially
and interactively embedded conception of cognitive processes and
meaning-giving in general. Secondly, Wittgenstein was not unaware
of the debates in psychology in the first half of the twentieth century,
and in fact wrote extensively on the philosophy of psychology (Witt-
genstein 1980a, 1980b). In these he developed clear and coherent
critiques of cognitive mentalism and notions of mind and conscious-
ness as individual and abstracted from socio-cultural processes.
Before these aspects of his thought are explicitly translated to the
development of discursive social psychology (in the following sec-
tions) Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language must briefly be
explained. Although the later philosophy is often depicted as radical-
ly different from the earlier work, it was in fact guided by the same
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concern: namely, to understand and account for the burden of mean-
ing that rests on language. How is it achieved, and what are its li-
mits? The difference between the earlier and the later philosophy is
that Wittgenstein chose a new point of departure, one that did not as-
sume language to be transparent or meaning to be determined by
fixed essences or transcendental identities. Because ordinary language
is clearly meaningful, at least in the sense of successfully facilitating
communication between people, philosophy should abstain from im-
posing the transcendental question upon it. Philosophy should rather
investigate the constitution and negotiation of meaning in various
communicative contexts, and restrict itself to the task of clarifying
misunderstandings.
Wittgenstein studied many de facto instances of language use,
showing that meaning is governed by relatively stable, coherent pat-
terns of use that can be referred to as language games. Religious lan-
guage, for example, with all its concepts, statements, metaphors and
symbols, constitutes a language game that differs in terms of its re-
quirements for meaningfulness from the language game of science.
One language game cannot be judged from the perspective of an-
other, for each carries its own criteria for meaning and truth (Pears
1985: 101). Therefore, meaningful communication is not achieved in
terms of a universal grammatical logic, but according to a “depth
grammar” that is unique to the particular language game. This
“depth grammar” can be described as “a set of publicly accepted rules
or culturally determined conventions which govern the use of lan-
guage within that language game” (Van der Merwe & Voestermans
1995: 33). Furthermore, these conventions are not present in the lan-
guage game as fixed conceptual identities or abstract common fac-
tors. Rather, as the members of a family resemble one another with-
out there being one exact and essential feature that links them, so the
uses of words in a language game resemble one another. 
The idea that the meanings of words, utterances or other speech
acts are to be found in the analysis of their use, and that use is go-
verned by rules that are conventional rather than transcendental, had
a huge impact on social psychologists disillusioned with traditional
social psychology. This disillusionment almost invariably related to
social psychology’s individualism: because social processes were redu-
ced to individual cognitive ones the discipline became progressively
silent on issues of greater social concern, such as racism and gender
(Parker 1989a). While some social psychologists attempted to reme-
dy this neglect of the social by means of technical innovations (for
example, arguing for natural rather than laboratory research set-
tings), others sought a solution at the level of social psychology’s phi-
losophical assumptions about its subject matter. This was facilitated
by the linguistic turn in philosophy.
The influence of analytic philosophy here, as will become clear in
subsequent sections, is not confined to Wittgenstein. Partly due to his
influence, analytic philosophy developed an enduring focus on ordina-
ry language and the non-referential functions of language. Examples
include the work done by J L Austin on performatives (Austin 1962),
as well as other functions of language such as metaphor, rhetoric and
narrative that are now studied in many contexts, among other things
for the part they play in the language games of science and philosophy
(Taylor 1996). Insofar as these developments are part of the legacy of
Ludwig Wittgenstein, we owe them to his concern for the action
orientation of language: its ability to constitute and construct, not
only to represent things and facts in the world.
1.2 De Saussure and post-structuralism
Although post-structuralism also takes a non-referential approach to
language, its accounts and uses of language differ in important ways
from those of the tradition discussed above. These differences are ac-
centuated by the fact that the two approaches developed indepen-
dently, both in geographical terms and with regard to their intellec-
tual precursors. The term post-structuralism is used here to refer to
all developments in (especially French) philosophy and social science
which draw on the linguistic work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1974),
but are critical of the “positivist” programme of structuralism which
became its immediate application in the social sciences. Even though
the critics who are referred to as post-structuralists differ markedly
from one another, it would be difficult to understand figures such as
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan and Roland Barthes
without reference to the influence of the structuralist linguistics of
Ferdinand de Saussure (Kearney 1995: 1-10).
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As a tradition of thinking about language and the social world,
post-structuralism contributed in important ways to contemporary
developments in social psychology. In some circles, for example, Fou-
cault’s definition of discourse provides the paradigmatic understand-
ing of the unit of analysis in social psychology (Parker 1992: 5). More
generally, post-structuralism’s view of language does not limit its
constructive capacity to ordinary use, but extends it to frameworks of
meaning that precede and determine our seemingly individual and
voluntary use of words. This emphasis, which in fact implies that the
realities, social relations and identities we experience as natural are in
fact textual, enables a political critique of strategies of power and do-
mination, processes that naturalise realities of oppression and margi-
nalised identities. The meanings in which our experiences are sub-
merged are not only conventional achievements, but ideological
achievements that reproduce power relations in society.
In order to understand the implications of this for social psycholo-
gy it is necessary first to address the logic of De Saussure’s structuralist
linguistics. De Saussure’s model of language informed a view of reality
as radically textualised (Culler 1976: 90-117). Starting out by saying
the basic element of language is the linguistic sign, he goes on to state
that the sign should be sub-divided into a signifier (a word) and a sig-
nified (a concept). In terms of the traditional conception of language
as nomenclature this would simply have meant that the signifier
serves as a name for a concept that has an existence outside of lan-
guage. However, De Saussure immediately refutes this traditional
image of language by postulating what he referred to as the arbitrary
nature of the sign. On the most basic level, the sign is arbitrary in the
sense that no signifier can have an intrinsic link with a signified. For
example, there is no intrinsic reason why the device on which this
sentence is typed should be called a “keyboard” and not a “horse”; but
this, of course, we already knew about language. De Saussure’s contri-
bution was a radicalisation of this idea.
More fundamentally then, the arbitrary nature of the sign also
implies that language articulates its own categories and concepts,
rather than just naming a pre-existing field of concepts and catego-
ries in an arbitrary fashion (Culler 1976: 23-9). This can be illustra-
ted quite simply with reference to the problem of translation. The
mere existence of different languages confirms the first dimension of
the arbitrary nature of the sign. What is called a “keyboard” in En-
glish, for example, is called a “sleutelbord” in Afrikaans. However,
translation is rarely as straightforward as in the above example.
When confronted with another language, we are regularly also con-
fronted with conceptual fields, or categorisations of the world, that
differ from the concepts and categories that characterise the represen-
tation of reality in our own language.
Culler (1976: 23) provides a good summary of De Saussure’s un-
derstanding of the arbitrary nature of the sign, saying that “since
there are no fixed universal concepts or fixed universal signifiers, the
signified itself is arbitrary, and so is the signifier”. The linguistic
principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign, particularly the implica-
tion that the signified is itself arbitrary, immediately confounds the
idea that meaning is uncontaminated by language. It also makes it
possible to understand a further dimension of De Saussure’s model,
namely his distinction between parole and langue. With these terms
he distinguishes between individual utterances or language use and
an autonomous, self-regulatory system of rules governing the mean-
ingfulness of linguistic signs and thus of individual instances of lan-
guage use. Because signs are arbitrary it does not make linguistic
sense to study parole: if the conceptual and categorical demarcations
that guide signification in a language are not anchored in an extra-
linguistic realm, they must somehow be conjured up by language it-
self. Meaning precedes the experiential encounter of its speakers with
the world and therefore necessitates an account that is restricted to
the level of langue. For De Saussure the production principle that go-
verns meaning is to be found in the differential nature of the linguis-
tic system. That is, signs have meaning because they differ from
other signs in the system. De Saussure (1974: 117) explains this in
the following manner:
[I]n all cases, then, we discover not ideas given in advance but va-
lues emanating from the system. When we say that these values cor-
respond to concepts, it is understood that these concepts are purely
differential, not positively defined by their content but negatively
defined by their relations with other terms of the system. Their
most precise characteristic is that they are what the others are not.
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In itself this theory of language destroys at the outset the tradi-
tional conception of reality as appearing to consciousness independ-
ent of language, and ushers in a notion of reality as textually consti-
tuted. The structuralism to which De Saussure was committed was,
however, still characteristically positivist (and modernist) in its in-
tended scientific scope. Its aim was nothing less than the laying bare
of the complete structure of meaning in a given system at a given
time. Post-structuralism, in stark contrast, is based on the premise
that meaning can never be present in a way that would make such a
project possible, and that interpretation is therefore a much more
complex task. This re-reading is in effect a radicalisation of the idea
of difference, as can be illustrated with reference to Jacques Derrida’s
(1974: 27-73) reading of De Saussure’s model of language.
If meaning is the product of differences within the system, and if
the sign is arbitrary to the extent that signifieds are not locations
outside language, then the distinction between signifiers and signi-
fieds becomes largely artificial. Because all linguistic elements are
differential values within the system, signifieds are just signifiers
seen from a different angle — they lose the essential referents that
would make them less textual and warrant any substantial distinc-
tion from signifiers. This also means that every signified can in turn
be the signifier of another signified, a process which can continue in-
determinately. In Derrida’s account the signified, and thus the last
resort to a reality outside of language, is deconstructed; all that re-
main are chains of signifiers. In post-structuralist theory the arbitrary
nature of the sign is taken to its extreme, as meaning that language
never signifies its own exteriority. As Derrida (1974: 158) would
have it, “there is nothing outside the text”.
The fact that language continuously folds back upon itself does
not mean it is a closed system. While structuralism would still have
supposed such closure, and therefore the possibility of assuming a
fixed hermeneutic position in relation to it, Derrida’s deconstruction
of the relation between the signifier and the signified effectively
showed not only that meaning is the product of difference, but that
it is always deferred. Because a signified is always a signifier to some-
thing else, the process of signification is itself always a simultaneous
arrival and departure of meaning. The retrieval or tracing of meaning
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is always suspended according to a (non)logic which Derrida calls dif-
férance (Caputo 1987: 144-5). Any attempt to create a fixed herme-
neutic position, or a final interpretation, will yield only the traces of
signifiers and signifieds which are, yet again, the traces of new signi-
fiers. Language is thus fundamentally open, and meaning is always
undecided. This undecidability of meaning makes signification a site
of struggle too; it always calls forth processes of both construction
and deconstruction.
It is not necessary to dwell on the further complexities of Derri-
da’s reading or on other post-structuralist developments at this stage.
For the purposes of this paper the important principles arising from
structuralism and post-structuralism in terms of the concept of lan-
guage as a non-referential system can be summarised as follows. First,
meaning is a structural and not an individual affair. Paul Ricoeur
(1979: 261) formulates this structuralist dimension very well when
he says it implies a shift from seeing social reality as the referent of
language to seeing it
as a system of codified signs; if the various orders — economic, fa-
mily, political and religious — can be held to be systems of com-
munication governed by structured laws like that of language, then
it is no longer possible to say that signs are of sociological origin;
one must say, rather, that society is of semiological origin.
Post-structuralist developments would agree on the semiological
or textual origin of social institutions and social life (including indi-
vidual identity and experience), but would contest an attempt to see
the textual realm as entirely codified. The second principle derived
from these developments is therefore that, because it is the product
of an open system of differences, meaning is also indeterminate. To-
gether these principles had important and interesting ramifications
in the social sciences, and found fertile ground in disciplines such as
sociology and anthropology, in particular, from as early as the 1950s.
Yet (social) psychologists have only recently seriously begun to incor-
porate post-structuralist ideas into their discipline. One reason for
this reluctance has been the metatheoretical, cultural and political
currency of individualism in traditional social psychology. Language
as theorised from a post-structuralist perspective decentres the hu-
man subject: individual experience and the notion of the person must
themselves be seen as textual effects. In other words, semiotic analyses
are not performed on an individual level of analysis, but inevitably on
a broad social or cultural level. This is directly at odds with traditional
social psychology’s individual-centred approach to social life.
In recent years, however, individualism has come to be seen as the
source of the majority of the conceptual and political impasses expe-
rienced by social psychology (Parker 1989b: 56-69). Conceptually,
individualism is based on an understanding of mental life and cogni-
tive processes as centralised and existing prior to social life. In the
next two sections, based on Wittgenstein’s insights, it will be argued
that such an understanding rests on epistemological fallacies. How-
ever, post-structuralist critiques provide different explanations for
the currency of individualism in social psychology, as well as explain-
ing its effects. This will be discussed in more detail in a later section,
but it is important to clarify at least some of these critiques here. In-
dividualism is an important cultural value in modern Western socie-
ties, having come into prominence partly in response to the social re-
quirements created by such developments as industrialisation, free
market capitalism and democracy. Social psychology not only mirrors
this cultural value in its own individualism, but helped give Western
individualism its peculiar form by providing many of the theoretical
and practical artefacts (such as the measurement of attitude and opi-
nion polling) used to regulate the “society of individuals” (Elias
1991). For this reason traditional social psychology can be critiqued
as socially conservative. For example: explaining racism on the level
of cognitive processes neglects the social genesis of discrimination
and the institutionalised nature of power differences in a society. Ra-
cism becomes a natural phenomenon to be attributed to our limited
cognitive capacities. For this reason Edward Sampson (1981: 730)
went so far as to say that cognitive social psychology is an ideology.
While there are major differences between the various non-
referential approaches to language discussed thus far, they do provide
the theoretical resources necessary to move beyond individualism in
social psychology. In the remaining sections the focus will be on stra-
tegies for producing a socially responsive social psychology derived
from both ordinary language and post-structuralist ideas.
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2. Discourse as doing: a new approach to social 
cognition
This section returns to the ordinary language approach established
by Wittgenstein, and reflects on its incorporation into social psycho-
logy. Accounts of language and meaning-giving that focus on per-
formance and usage facilitate an understanding of the individual as
an active agent of meaning without falling into the trap of reducing
social processes to individual cognitive ones. The reason for this is
that when the focus is placed on what people do with language it be-
comes clear that meaning-giving is an interactional, contextual and
even contradictory (and thus argumentative) process.
It has already been stated that traditional forms of social psycho-
logy, with its cognitive and especially its information processing me-
taphors, rarely escapes individualistic reductionism. The dominant
cognitive approaches to social psychology have been cognitive disso-
nance theory, attribution theory, and lately social cognition. All these
approaches focus on purely individual mental processes and states
like achieving cognitive balance, decision-making, attitudes and
attitude change, stereotypes and social schemas. The individual is set
up as a solitary perceptual subject, and cognitive processes are there-
fore theorised as ontologically separated from social interaction. Hu-
man cognition is an isolated, private and natural process, functional-
ly involved with the processing of information and not itself depend-
ent on social processes. Social behaviour, it follows, can be reduced to
the complex architecture and processes of an intra-psychic realm. By
means of this treatment of its subject matter, cognitive social psycho-
logy perpetuates an ontological distinction between cognition and
society.
Given these limitations, it is necessary to find better conceptions
of what is at stake psychologically when people engage in actions
such as remembering, categorising, attributing, judging and dis-
claiming (Edwards & Potter 1992: 1-11). An important step forward
is the acknowledgement that traditional information-processing ac-
counts of cognition depend on language’s being treated as a transpa-
rent medium of thought. A different understanding of social cogni-
tion and of meaning-making in general therefore emerges when lan-
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guage is encountered as non-referential and performative in the sense
established by Wittgenstein and his heirs.
That traditional cognitive social psychology bases its theory of
meaning on the assumption that language is transparent and referen-
tial is forcefully revealed in the methodological form that most of its
inquiries take. Social psychology is traditionally described as the dis-
cipline that studies social thought and thinking. Although this can
only be revealed in language, it is not language itself that is address-
ed; the unit of analysis is an internal process, namely cognition or in-
formation processing. Language is thus informative for social psycho-
logy, but since the methodological task of the cognitive social psy-
chologist is to move through language to the underlying cognitive
processes and structures, language should be made transparent. Con-
sider the technology of the questionnaire as an example. It is con-
structed by de-contextualising and generalising individual proposi-
tions, so that they can be presented to a respondent as a circumscri-
bed set of statements to which s/he can respond in an equally deter-
mined manner: a set of items that from the outset encloses its own
universe of possible psychological meanings.
Discursive social psychology attempts to undermine these tradi-
tional assumptions and still provide an adequate account of meaning-
making processes. It does this by saying that social psychology can-
not assume language to be transparent without allowing for serious
theoretical, empirical and methodological reductions. As Edwards &
Potter (1992: 12) make clear, “the understanding of everyday prac-
tices has been deformed by a combination of methodological pre-
scription and a failure to theorize language as the primary mode of
social activity”. Or, as Potter & Wetherell (1987: 1) write, “the fai-
lure to accommodate to discourse damages their [traditional social
psychologists’] theoretical and empirical adequacy”. To rectify these
reductions the focus in social psychology should shift from assumed
mental processes to the study of discourse, which here means lan-
guage as it is used, or language as social action. Focussing on the use
of language in this way enables the discipline still to address tradi-
tional constructs such as attribution and categorisation, while now
conceptualising them as discursive processes, and therefore as contex-
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tual and rhetorical achievements (Billig 1991: 1-5). In the words of
Edwards & Potter (1992: 2-3):
[R]ather than seeing such discursive constructions as expressions of
speakers’ underlying cognitive states, they are examined in the
context of their occurrence as situated and occasioned constructions
whose precise nature makes sense, to participants and analysts alike,
in terms of the social actions those descriptions accomplish.
Categorisation, or social categorisation as it is often referred to in
order to locate it as a concern of social psychology, provides a useful
example of this dimension of the discursive approach. The categori-
sation of the social world, and reacting to other people as members
of various social categories, is traditionally theorised as an intra-
psychic cognitive process that only becomes social when it is directed
towards a stimulus domain constituted of other people. Discursive
social psychology, on the level discussed here, challenges such an ap-
plication of cognitive levels of explanation to social thinking. It ar-
gues that it is possible to disconnect social psychology from general
(cognitive) psychology by maintaining that categorisation can be ad-
dressed more thoroughly as a feature of social thinking when it is
seen as a discursive rather than an information-processing phenome-
non. In other words, when categorisation is seen as something that
people do with language in communicative contexts rather than a
hidden mental operation merely reflected in language.
The work of Michael Billig provides a good example of this gene-
ral tendency and of categorisation in particular. Billig (1985: 79-
103) discusses categorisation in the context of the study of prejudice,
an important traditional focus of social psychological research and
theorising. The cognitive (information-processing) revolution in psy-
chology had an interesting effect on the study of prejudice. While
earlier approaches, such as the work on the authoritarian personality
(Adorno et al 1950), saw prejudice as a cognitive style that should be
distinguished from tolerant thinking on account of its rigidity and
inability to accept ambivalence and difference, information-
processing accounts made prejudice a natural and general characteris-
tic of all thinking. We all simplify and distort the social world be-
cause of our limited information-processing capacity. This concept
remained part of social psychology and infiltrated social cognition
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and inter-group theories as well, causing Billig (1985: 80) to lament
that the concept of tolerance all but “slips from the social psycholo-
gical agenda”.
Billig (1985) indicates that categorisation as conceptualised in
cognitive social psychology plays a crucial part in the above-
mentioned shift. Four themes are relevant here. First, categorisation
is seen as a basic element or building-block of all thinking. In other
words, nobody concerned with the bestowal of meaning on the social
environment can afford to overlook categorisation. Billig (1985: 81)
quotes Henri Tajfel (1981) as saying “social categorization lies at the
heart of commonsense, everyday knowledge and understanding [...]
it is central in social life”. Secondly, the process of categorisation in-
volves the simplification and the subsequent distortion of the stimu-
lus field. Since it is a function of a general cognitive economy driven
by limited information-processing capacity, the social perceiver is al-
ways prone to do injustice to what s/he perceives. Thirdly, and in re-
lation to the above, categorisation leads inevitably to stereotypical
thinking about other people. Finally, if stereotypical perception is a
natural response, prejudice is also to a certain extent inevitable. That
is, in terms of this particular model of human thinking, there is no
conceptual room for any other type of thought than that which is
prejudiced.
The issue of debate here is not whether people are normally pre-
judiced or tolerant and open towards other people. The problem is
that prejudice is seen as inevitable, natural, and an entirely individu-
al constraint on social perception. This completely ignores the fact
that antagonism between social groups has its base in historical and
ideological phenomena, and that social groups themselves are not na-
tural but constructed categories. In reality people do not arrive at
their derogatory stereotypes in isolation from other people, but
through sharing with other people a discursive space and interests in
particular meanings and social outcomes. Moreover, and Billig makes
this very clear in his subsequent writings, even when people do en-
gage in prejudiced thinking, this thinking is not as rigid or as consis-
tent as it is made out to be. In order for statements to be meaningful
and compelling, they have to be continuously negotiated as such.
They have to argue for particular versions of events and skilfully close
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down alternative positions. The construction of a prejudiced account
of other people, an out-group, will therefore reveal many contradic-
tions and depend on the sophisticated use of disclaimers and other
rhetorical devices (Billig 1991: 49). Standard questionnaires, pre-
mised as they are on the consistency and often the rigidity of
thought, miss something very important about how individuals real-
ly make sense of their experiences and social life.
Billig (1985: 82) proposes an interesting theoretical advance in
the study of categorisation (and prejudice) which overcomes what he
calls the traditional bureaucratic model of thought: categorisation al-
ways has a dialectical counterpart, namely particularisation. He ex-
plains this notion in the following manner:
If categorization refers to the process by which a particular stimulus
is placed in a general category, or grouped with other stimuli, then
particularization refers to the process by which a particular stimulus
is distinguished from a general category or from other stimuli. The
term ‘particularization’ would cover the process by which an indivi-
dual stimulus might be extracted from a category or by which it is
distinguished from the category in the first place; above all it covers
the processes by which a particular stimulus is treated as a particular
or ‘special case’.
Because traditional perceptual accounts cannot explain such flexibili-
ties in thinking, and must see categorisation as a natural process di-
vorced from the particular demands made by the communicative con-
text, it is necessary to find a better conception of this process. Billig
suggests that language might be useful in this regard. Language
forms an integral part of the process of social thinking, and it is not
bound by the perceptual and functional constraints imposed by the
traditional cognitive models. In Billig’s (1985: 85) own words,
although perceptual schemes may simplify information, it is not
clear that linguistic categories must do so. Thus language can be
used both to simplify and to enrich; similarly, language can be used
to categorize or ‘lump together’ particulars, but it can also be used
to particularize and to argue for special cases.
Since it is in and through language that social thinking occurs, Billig
argues that language itself provides a better model for understanding
what is traditionally studied as social cognition. Empirically speak-
ing this means that it would be more productive for social psycholo-
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gy to focus “on the actual categories of language, rather than the in-
ferred categories of perception” (Billig 1987: 135). How do people
manage to bestow meaning on the world by carving it up into parts,
and what is it that they achieve when they do this? This opens social
psychology up immensely, because the actual categories of language
are negotiated among people, have a historical genesis, and resonate
with ideological themes that naturalise aspects such as the particular
configurations of inter-group relations, status and power in a society.
Potter & Wetherell (1987: 116), in their important introduction to
discursive social psychology, provide a good evaluation of Billig’s
contribution to the study of social categorisation:
Instead of seeing categorization as a natural phenomenon —  some-
thing which just happens, automatically — it is regarded as a com-
plex and subtle social accomplishment. [T]his work emphasizes the
action orientation of categorization in discourse. It asks how catego-
ries are flexibly articulated in the course of certain sorts of talk and
writing to accomplish particular goods, such as blamings and justi-
fications.
It has been argued here that the incorporation of performative ac-
counts of language into social psychology redirects the focus of the
discipline to the “action orientation of talking and writing” (Ed-
wards & Potter 1992: 2). This recognition of the rhetorical and per-
formative aspects of language, and thus of the situated and emergent
nature of social psychological phenomena, therefore disentangles so-
cial psychology from cognitive psychology, both theoretically and
empirically. As Potter & Wetherell (1987: 35) state, “the point is
that analysis and explanation can be carried out at a social psycholo-
gical level which is coherently separable from the cognitive”. The
importance of this, of course, is that social psychology becomes more
responsive to social and historical dynamics.
3. Language, mind, and society
The above delineation of discursive social psychology does not mean
that it merely disentangles itself from the traditional cognitive meta-
theory, leaving the assumptions of traditional cognitive psychology
unquestioned. While it is true that discursive social psychologists at
times refrain from taking on cognitive psychology on a conceptual
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level, this is often a pragmatic bracketing rather than a philosophical
agreement with the dominant paradigm. Certain general problems
are acknowledged with regard to cognitive metatheory, but set aside
in order to focus on the practical and methodological aspects of dis-
cursive analysis itself. As Edwards & Potter (1992: 19) make clear,
they “bracket, or set aside, the issue of reductionism and origins in
favour of an orientation to method and analysis”. But not all discur-
sive social psychologists choose to remain at this level of critique —
in fact, even the authors mentioned in other contexts have provided
strong foundational critiques of cognitive psychology and the ideal of
a purely individual psychology. Discursive social psychology will
now be described from the perspective of the philosophy of language
providing the impetus for foundational critiques of cognitivism,
mentalism and the individualism they entail.
In this regard the focus will remain on Wittgenstein and the ap-
plication of his work to psychology. A shift from a referential to a non-
referential model of language denies psychology any fantasy of re-
treating into a notion of mind and meaning-making (cognition) that
is centralised and functional, or operates according to formal laws and
symbolic or propositional representations. Such a notion of mind,
which is highly characteristic of cognitive psychology and underlies
the description of cognition as information processing, is only pos-
sible when language is assumed to be transparent. Even though cog-
nitive processes are not directly observable, they can then be treated
as if they exist within individual minds independent of language.
Once the referential model of language is challenged it becomes
difficult to maintain that the concepts of psychological language
really refer to discrete mental entities or processes. According to
Wittgenstein’s later understanding of linguistic meaning as socially
and conventionally bound up in language games, as discussed above,
we discover the meaning of words by learning their currency within
a specific speech community. As Billig (1997: 39) puts it: “We learn
how to use words such as ‘table’ and ‘chair’ by observing how these
words are used: in this way, we learn the appropriate language games,
in which such words are used”. Linguistic meaning is regulated, in
other words, by public criteria. Chairs and tables, of course, are phy-
sical phenomena and it is easy to argue for a referential understand-
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ing of language based on them. This is not the case with words in-
vested with psychological meaning, such as “remembering” or “un-
derstanding”. They also owe their meaning to the accomplishment of
socially produced criteria, and it is wrong to assume that they refer
to discrete mental states or process. What counts as an instance of
“understanding,” for example, cannot be related to inner mental acts
or representations. Wittgenstein (1988: para. 332) exposes this tra-
ditional fallacy by means of the following seductive little “exercise”:
“Say a sentence and think it; say it with understanding. — And now
do not say it, just do what you accompanied it with when you said
it.”
It should immediately be clear that this is impossible. It is im-
possible to engage in mental activity without engaging in language.
And language (like meaning) is a public or social phenomenon. In
these terms, Wittgenstein challenges the mentalistic theory of mea-
ning and thus locates mind (and cognitive events) in the public or so-
cial domain. He shows compellingly that when we think, inevitably
in language, “there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through my mind in ad-
dition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of
thought” (Wittgenstein 1988: par 329). Cognitive psychology buys
into mentalism because it neglects a basic feature of language, name-
ly that it is not primarily referential. In terms of seeing the individu-
al agent of meaning as an information-processing system, the lesson
to be drawn from Wittgenstein’s critique is that “we don’t first pro-
cess information (in our heads), and then act according to the forth-
coming instructions”; in other words, there is no “dual processing of
information” (Durrheim 1997: 179).
It should now be clear that meaningful conduct cannot be ab-
stracted from a social interactional context. Cognition is always loca-
ted and the achievement of meaning takes place “outside”, not “with-
in” us. The full implication of these ideas for psychology in general
has translated into what many now refer to as social constructionism
(Danziger 1997: 399-416; Gergen 1985: 255-265; Shotter 1993a:
1). Because there is no corresponding reality merely mirrored by our
statements, constructionism in psychology entails that mind and
cognition are de-centred from the individual to the conversational
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sphere of interpersonal and cultural life. Psychology should therefore
not concern itself with imposing its own language games but rather: 
provide an account of psychological ‘objects’ (mind, intentions, rea-
soning, etc), human action, and social practice by showing the ‘con-
ditions of possibility’ within which they are imbedded (Durrheim
1997: 181).
These conditions of possibility are primarily linguistic: they are the
language games and depth grammars which Wittgenstein (1988)
describes. In other words (making the link with the previous section
clear) they are meaningful frameworks that function as sources from
which particular individual speech acts and identities are made
possible. Psychology itself, since it traditionally assumed its own
language games to be simple truths, adds to this background against
which people negotiate meaning. Such a focus can thus encompass a
critical reflection on the way in which Western psychology found its
language, as well as refurnishing psychology as a science that studies
multiple constructions of persons and meaningful actions in various
contexts.
In other words, according to social constructionism, insofar as
there can be an ontological base for psychology as a science of per-
sons, this should be sought in language. As Harré & Gillet (1994:
27) state, “discursive phenomena, for example, acts of remembering,
are not manifestations of hidden subjective, psychological phenome-
na. They are the psychological phenomena”. John Shotter (1993b:
73), another important social constructionist psychologist, agrees
that reality is conversationally constituted and maintained, and fol-
lows this up by saying that “an understanding of anything psycholo-
gical is an understanding of the role of language in human affairs”.
The developments in language discussed in this section thus underlie
a discursive model in which the significance of discourse transcends
the study of performance to an ontology
in which utterances, interpreted as speech acts, become the primary
entities in which minds become personalized, as privatized
discourses. In this ontology, people are locations for discourses, both
public and private (Harré & Gillet 1994: 36).
The above remarks should make it clear that the relation between
general and social psychology has undergone a radical shift. It is no
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longer possible to see social psychology as a derivative of a general
psychology located within an isolated individual mind. Rather, the
non-referential nature of language de-centres psychology, making it
to be social primarily, and only secondarily individual. Psychological
phenomena are emergent properties, and discursive processes can be
used to explain the social construction of individual persons as posi-
tioned vantage-points of experience.
In combination, the last two sections have traced the implications
of analytic or ordinary language philosophy (with the focus on Witt-
genstein) for social psychology. The discussion in the present section
has specifically made it clear that the introduction of language to so-
cial psychology adds philosophically to the empirical and theoretical
shifts described in the previous section. It becomes possible to address
social psychology as a completely separate disciplinary formation.
4. Discourse and power
The developments discussed thus far have focused on language in its
rhetorical or performative sense. However, the analysis does not end
with individual speech acts: because meanings do not emerge with-
out a prior background that guides, constrains and enables what can
be said, there has been a further focus on what David Bloor (1983: 6)
calls “the contribution that society makes to our knowledge”. This
aspect of meaning was well provided for by Wittgenstein’s notion of
language games, which implies treating language not only as located
performance, but as constrained by a history of use. However, while
it focuses on the prior resources on which people draw, Wittgen-
stein’s work nevertheless gives a limited account of power: language
games are consensual domains, and there is no questioning of who is
favoured by particular patterns of signification, or who is rendered
silent. The organisation of social psychology around the conceptions
of language discussed thus far can therefore lead to another form of
neglect of the political nature of social life (Parker 1996: 363-84).
This feeds into the concerns of some critical social psychologists that
social constructionist approaches may treat discursive processes as
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purely linguistic, thus neglecting the material aspects of social prac-
tices (Parker 1998).
It is precisely this dimension, the relation between discourse,
power and material practices, that is added by post-structuralist ap-
proaches to language in social psychology (Henriques et al 1984: 1-
9; Parker 1992: 1). As has been made clear, post-structuralist theo-
ries see language as a larger, more abstract signifying system that
makes individual usage derivative of the internal logic of the system.
It is therefore not concerned with what individuals can achieve with
language, but with how language itself constructs subjectivity, expe-
rience and possible patterns of social interaction. While we have dis-
cussed Derrida’s work as a general introduction to a post-structuralist
account of language and meaning, it is Michel Foucault’s under-
standing of discourse, power and social life that has exerted the
strongest influence on social psychology from a broadly post-
structuralist orientation. More specifically, his work provides a valu-
able example of the impact of a post-structuralist approach to mean-
ing and discourse on the relationship between social scientific know-
ledge, individual subjectivity and the reproduction of power rela-
tions in society.
It is outside the scope of this article to provide a detailed introduc-
tion to Foucault’s work. However, some brief comments will suffice to
show how post-structuralist conceptions of discourse differ from what
has been discussed up to this point, informing a social psychology not
so much interested in how individuals construct social reality through
language as in how discourses and discursive practices position indi-
viduals and pattern their experience. Late in his career, Foucault
(1982: 777) saw his own intellectual project as being “to create a his-
tory of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings
are made subjects”. The creation of such a history does not comprise
a succession of discrete events, but the uncovering of the structuring
principles that underlie and make possible ways of talking and doing,
and understanding ourselves, that are dominant in particular eras.
This approach can be illustrated in terms of the development of
the human sciences and Foucault indeed focuses on these. Since lan-
guage is not transparent, but rather constructs the world as a textual
domain (in this his De Saussurian roots are clear), the birth and
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growth of the human sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies contributed something very significant: it ushered in the indi-
vidual human being as itself an object of human understanding and
knowledge in ways that it had not been before (Foucault 1972). The
human sciences (and psychology in particular) therefore did not dis-
cover the hidden depths of the modern individual and the psycholo-
gical subject. They constructed the individual being as a psychologi-
cal subject. Knowledge is thus socially constructed in that it belongs
to particular historical periods and has no fixed referent outside of the
discursive practices that produce it. The human sciences are therefore
seen to construct the objects of their knowledge claims, and in this
way prepare them for social regulation.
While the role of language or discourse shifted in his work, Fou-
cault maintained an account of the subject as an effect rather than an
agent of social processes. The appearance of discovery and truth that
emanate from the human sciences depends on generative epistemolo-
gical configurations that precede and make possible particular disci-
plinary formations. These configurations — Foucault (1972) called
them épistèmes — function like Saussure’s notion of langue: they are
not to be equated with actual scientific statements but rather exist as
abstract conditions of possibility for a range of possible statements
and practices regarding their own textually demarcated objects.
What is more, these epistemological frameworks and related discur-
sive practices also determine and delineate the places from which it
is possible to speak and act, to be referred to here as subject positions.
More radical than Kuhn’s (1970) notion of paradigm, épistèmes not
only determine the discursive space and regulative activities of the
(human) sciences; they reveal themselves in and structure all discur-
sive activities and social practices, giving rise to pervasive textual
matrices from which particular forms of subjectivity emerge.
In his later writings (especially 1977 and 1981) Foucault became
more concerned with the role of power in discursive practices. The
construction of the person that emerged from the discourses of the
modern era, and specifically from the human sciences, medicine and
various new forms of social control, produced a subjectivity that is re-
gulated and subjected to societal scrutiny in a unique way: the mo-
dern subject is self-regulatory. In order to understand this it is im-
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portant to grasp the unique way in which Foucault conceived of
power and its relation to knowledge (and thus specifically to the hu-
man sciences). In this regard Ian Parker (1989b: 61-2), who played
an important role in introducing Foucault’s ideas to social psycholo-
gy, provides a good description:
Power is usually thought of as the exercise of the will of one social
actor over others. This model of power is most appropriate, accor-
ding to Foucault, to the period up to the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury. After that date the growth in population, and the concentra-
tion of economic production, had reached the point where ‘discipli-
nary’ power became dominant. This is a type of power that operates
independent of the intentions of individuals. The first model of
power can be thought of as ‘sovereign’ power. The second is rela-
tional — ‘disciplinary’. The character of disciplinary power is mask-
ed by the invitation that modern discourse makes to us to assume
full responsibility for our acts and intentions.
The invitation to which Parker refers is present in many different
discursive practices in contemporary society: practices such as certain
forms of therapy, advice columns in newspapers and magazines, and
television talk shows; practices that also involve material aspects
alongside their linguistic dimension. What they all have in common,
and for Foucault (1981) this was one of the keys to understanding
modern subjectivities, is a confessional structure. The implication of
this approach to discourse for a discipline wanting to study indivi-
dual lives and identities in social worlds is that it should always look
for the configurations of power/knowledge or discourses that prede-
termine and structure human experience in all contexts where indivi-
dual subjectivity is at stake. The focus should be on how identities
and forms of relationships are institutionally structured and main-
tained. Along with this it should analyse the effect of the continua-
tion of these discourses on the maintenance of relations of power in a
society. Consider the following explanation of the relevance of Fou-
cault’s approach to discourse studies for discursive social psychology:
Foucauldian discourse analytic approaches allow us to connect di-
rectly with issues of power and subjectification. These approaches
help us address how we are made into selves that speak, how we ex-
perience the self as if it were an individual enclosed thing, and the
way in which modes of disciplinary apparatus govern us. They are
also particularly useful for examining the circulation of psycholo-
gical talk through culture (Burman et al 1997: 2).
5. Conclusion
The many differences between these approaches to discourse are clear.
The post-structuralist approach focuses not on the rhetorical use of
language, but on discourses as abstract frameworks of meaning that
are generative of individual instances of language use. Discourses are
institutionalised ways of making sense of and experiencing the
world. The notion of institutionalisation here is very important, be-
cause discourses are not seen as consensual domains but as mecha-
nisms which, through the way they engage individuals, ensure the
maintenance of power relations. As this notion of discourse plays it-
self out in social psychology, activity, agency and experience retain
less currency. Post-structuralist approaches also show less concern for
attempts to establish “better” conceptions of mind or cognition.
They are more concerned with how notions of agency as a location of
meaning are socially constructed and what purposes they serve.
These differences often inform continuing philosophical and me-
tatheoretical debates, the most important of which to this discussion
is the well known agency-structure debate. While this debate de-
mands attention, it may also detract from the unified contribution
made by all these approaches to the creation of new possibilities for
social psychology. Clearly, discursive approaches all share a critique
of individualism in social psychology, a basic constructionist under-
standing of knowledge and experience, and the attribution of great
importance to language as a constitutive aspect in social life. It is,
however, true that ordinary language approaches may overstate the
rhetorical ability of people to create meaning and construct positions
and identities in talk (the agency side of the debate). This may lead
to a blindness to the insidious nature of power in social life. On the
other hand, post-structural approaches often pay too much attention
to power (the structure side), underplaying the obvious abilities of
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social actors to resist and to act in different ways. Unfortunately, on
the philosophical level this debate is probably limitless.
However, there are now enough examples of work in discursive
social psychology that draw on both ordinary language and post-
structuralist ideas, and pay attention to both creativity of agency and
the constraining aspects of structure — and it is precisely the at-
tempt to work with different approaches to language in social life, as
described here, that makes this possible. Empirical studies show that
individuals are incredibly sophisticated in their rhetorical and dis-
cursive activities, but that meanings are always related to broader so-
cial themes, often with ideological effects. In fact, the tension be-
tween structure and agency, society and the individual, should be
exploited rather than explained away. In this regard social psychology
mirrors the real social tensions, characteristic of modernisation and
social change, be-tween individual lives and social processes, and be-
tween personal identity projects and group ties. Social psychology
should be the discipline that thematises these tensions, and for this
purpose the broad area of discursive social psychology provides a va-
luable metatheoretical framework.
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